Revisiting El Desastre de Manila: Assessing Spain's chances of overturning the Battle of Manila Bay
What were the chances of the Spanish navy humiliating the United States in the Philippines? Despite the historical consensus that the Spanish fleet in the archipelago under Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo suffered a lopsided defeat brought by the American squadron under Commodore George Dewey, there remained perspectives which argue that the Spanish could have still won the day. Of course, even if the Spanish won against the Americans and preventing the latter from taking foothold in the colony, they would likely have to face the second phase of the Philippine Revolution nonetheless. At any rate, it may all be speculation at this juncture, but where do these notions trace their optimism? This concise article would try to trace potential sources of optimism on the Spaniards' capability to attain victory in the Battle of Manila Bay that occurred on May 1, 1898 and dissect them with available historical data.
The said notion might need further examination. The only superiority at the time the Spanish fleet in the Philippines could have boasted about was numerical superiority. The Spanish had 7 cruisers and 5 gunboats against the Americans having 4 cruisers and 2 gunboats. But the American squadron had the advantage in both tonnage and technology. The total tonnage of engaged ships from the Spanish side was 11,187 tons, while the American side was 19,447 tons. In addition, United States Navy ships at the time carried heavier guns than other comparable navies usually fit ships of similar size. The protected cruisers Olympia (Dewey's flagship), Boston, and Baltimore all had 8-inch guns. None of the Spanish ships had one. Only Fort San Antonio Abad in Intramuros had the larger 9-inch gun, but despite Spanish intentions, the Americans assured they would never be in the range of shoreline defenses. To compare, the Japanese protected cruisers which fought in the Sino-Japanese War three years earlier (Akitsushima, Takachiho, and Yoshino of the so-called Flying Squadron) all had 6-inch guns. For that matter, at 6,588 tons at full load, Olympia would be heavier than any of the aforementioned Japanese warships.
Besides heavier guns, the Americans clearly had the weaponry advantage with them. Their engaged vessels possessed 120 guns, while the Spanish vessels had 63. To add to the Spanish disadvantage, most of the Spanish fleet was composed of unprotected cruisers, including Montojo's flagship Reina Cristina, even though it was only a year older than Dewey's Olympia. This meant they lacked the armored design the American ships possessed. As if this was not enough, none of the Spanish ships were fast enough to match three of the four American cruisers (Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh). Reina Cristina, the fastest of the Spanish ships under Montojo's command at the time, was just about a match to the older Boston's top speed of 16 knots. To recall, Boston was part of the American initiative to create a "New Navy" through the "ABCD" ship program that also produced the cruisers Atlanta and Chicago, as well as the dispatch vessel Dolphin. Apparently, the Spanish failed to recognize that the United States Navy had long progressed since then. Spanish media perceptions on the supposed naval superiority of Spain in the Philippines did not help, making the so-called Desastre de Manila a more difficult pill to swallow at its aftermath.
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| Battle of Manila Bay Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
First notion: The superiority of the Spanish fleet could have overwhelmed the American squadron
The said notion might need further examination. The only superiority at the time the Spanish fleet in the Philippines could have boasted about was numerical superiority. The Spanish had 7 cruisers and 5 gunboats against the Americans having 4 cruisers and 2 gunboats. But the American squadron had the advantage in both tonnage and technology. The total tonnage of engaged ships from the Spanish side was 11,187 tons, while the American side was 19,447 tons. In addition, United States Navy ships at the time carried heavier guns than other comparable navies usually fit ships of similar size. The protected cruisers Olympia (Dewey's flagship), Boston, and Baltimore all had 8-inch guns. None of the Spanish ships had one. Only Fort San Antonio Abad in Intramuros had the larger 9-inch gun, but despite Spanish intentions, the Americans assured they would never be in the range of shoreline defenses. To compare, the Japanese protected cruisers which fought in the Sino-Japanese War three years earlier (Akitsushima, Takachiho, and Yoshino of the so-called Flying Squadron) all had 6-inch guns. For that matter, at 6,588 tons at full load, Olympia would be heavier than any of the aforementioned Japanese warships.
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| The Japanese cruiser Akitsushima was also present in Philippine waters in 1898 Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
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| Montojo and Dewey in an engraving Photo courtesy of War History Online |
Second notion: Better leadership could have prevented the Spanish loss at Manila Bay
Meanwhile, there was more to it than solely attaching the accusations to Montojo, veteran of naval actions in Mindanao and the Spanish-South American War (no less under the famed Admiral Casto Mendez Nuñez), in terms of losing the battle. Some may even argue that Montojo purposely lost the battle, as was the decision of the Spanish court later on. Dewey's support for Montojo's acquittal did not seem to help. Then again, it had to be considered that Montojo was about to meet the American squadron off Subic earlier. However, not only were the ships, particularly the unprotected cruiser Castilla, suffering from technical difficulties, the shore defenses in Subic have been delayed. It could therefore be posited that Montojo's retreat to Manila Bay was a tactic to lure the Americans in the mines of Corregidor, hoping that these antiquated defenses could somehow damage Dewey's squadron. Unfortunately for the Spanish, the mines did not seem to work as the American ships emerged into Manila Bay. Another rationale, at least on Montojo's part, to bring the battle to Manila Bay was to find a way to rescue the crew in the event the ships fail. The waters there were shallower than that of Subic.
Yet what may be missed at this juncture was the fact that the Spanish did not decide to reinforce the Philippines earlier. At the aftermath of the battle, Spain finally decided to send a larger fleet under the command of Admiral Manuel de la Camara in June 1898. This included the battleship Pelayo and the armored cruiser Emperador Carlos V. The mission, hyped as it was by Spanish media as the nation's impending vengeance for Manila Bay, was aborted after being recalled from the Red Sea. Perhaps Camara's squadron was never meant to operate in the Philippines. It would be speculative at this point. If, however, the Spanish decided to send Admiral Pascual Cervera's squadron of four protected cruisers and two destroyers to the Philippines in April 1898 instead of the historical mission to Cuba (which eventually led to a devastating loss in July 1898), then Montojo's fleet might have been in better standing when facing Dewey's squadron less than a month later. Neglect of beefing up the colony's naval defenses, which saw some of its warships removed from the Philippine front before war erupted with the United States, became an influential part in dooming Montojo's already daunting task.
Meanwhile, there was more to it than solely attaching the accusations to Montojo, veteran of naval actions in Mindanao and the Spanish-South American War (no less under the famed Admiral Casto Mendez Nuñez), in terms of losing the battle. Some may even argue that Montojo purposely lost the battle, as was the decision of the Spanish court later on. Dewey's support for Montojo's acquittal did not seem to help. Then again, it had to be considered that Montojo was about to meet the American squadron off Subic earlier. However, not only were the ships, particularly the unprotected cruiser Castilla, suffering from technical difficulties, the shore defenses in Subic have been delayed. It could therefore be posited that Montojo's retreat to Manila Bay was a tactic to lure the Americans in the mines of Corregidor, hoping that these antiquated defenses could somehow damage Dewey's squadron. Unfortunately for the Spanish, the mines did not seem to work as the American ships emerged into Manila Bay. Another rationale, at least on Montojo's part, to bring the battle to Manila Bay was to find a way to rescue the crew in the event the ships fail. The waters there were shallower than that of Subic.
Yet what may be missed at this juncture was the fact that the Spanish did not decide to reinforce the Philippines earlier. At the aftermath of the battle, Spain finally decided to send a larger fleet under the command of Admiral Manuel de la Camara in June 1898. This included the battleship Pelayo and the armored cruiser Emperador Carlos V. The mission, hyped as it was by Spanish media as the nation's impending vengeance for Manila Bay, was aborted after being recalled from the Red Sea. Perhaps Camara's squadron was never meant to operate in the Philippines. It would be speculative at this point. If, however, the Spanish decided to send Admiral Pascual Cervera's squadron of four protected cruisers and two destroyers to the Philippines in April 1898 instead of the historical mission to Cuba (which eventually led to a devastating loss in July 1898), then Montojo's fleet might have been in better standing when facing Dewey's squadron less than a month later. Neglect of beefing up the colony's naval defenses, which saw some of its warships removed from the Philippine front before war erupted with the United States, became an influential part in dooming Montojo's already daunting task.
The discipline of the Spanish navy might also be taken into consideration. Weaponry was one thing, but having capable operators of gunnery was another. This was particularly seen in Cuba, but even in the Philippines, Montojo also pointed out later to his "lack of all classes of personnel" to even man the ships they had sailing. In comparison, the Americans had already been preparing even before war broke out. On February 26, 1898, two months before the declaration of war was made, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt had messaged Dewey to "keep full on coal" and "prepare for war." This, in comparison with the relatively underprepared Spanish fleet, was a testament of how crew quality could also be a factor. If there was any consolation for Montojo's performance, only 145 of 5,859 shells the Americans used hit the Spanish ships, a success rate of around 2.5 percent. In addition, if we were to believe Spanish naval historian Agustin Ramon Rodriguez Gonzalez, the Americans purposely deflated their casualties in the Battle of Manila Bay. The single death in the American side was said to have not even come from enemy fire, but from heart attack. However, Rodriguez Gonzalez provided a heavier toll of 13 deaths and 30 wounded, deriving from reports trickling to the Spanish consulate in Hong Kong at the time. His interpretation of this would be Dewey apportioning battle deaths to deserters, which numbered 155. In comparison with the Spanish reporting 77 deaths and 271 wounded, the Americans would have still sustained less casualties overall. Perhaps a saving grace for Montojo's vindication was the later decision to clear the discharged navy officer of court martial charges.
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| Foreign spheres of influence in China Photo courtesy of ARCGIS |
Significance of the Battle of Manila Bay
While Jose Rizal himself, among key Filipino figures, may have his own preferences when analyzing the geopolitical position of the Philippines in the final years of the 19th century (i.e., Germany over the United States), there would be more than meets the eye when considering the balance of power in Asia. Neighboring China already found itself divided by the world powers, and with Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the latter also began to seize its own share in the region. Shortly after Manila Bay, the Americans found the Germans to be the most powerful threat to their presence in the Philippines with Vice Admiral Otto von Diederichs commanding the similarly sized East Asia Squadron, primarily tasked to protect German interests in the islands. With the protected cruiser Kaiserin Augusta as flagship, the Germans slowly built up a presence of eight warships, as compared with Dewey's six. However, there were other powers which have sent their naval forces to the Philippines as well, among them being the British, the French, and the Japanese, all also having interests in the archipelago. Taking into mind the international response to Spanish weakness in the Philippines, wherein the colonial government has been trying to suppress a two-year-old revolution, there might just be the possibility of the Philippines not only taken away from the Americans, but also being divided similar to the Chinese experience. Any nation which would successfully colonize the Philippines would tilt the balance in Asia, and a pragmatic way to ensure this would not happen included the division of the archipelago itself. After all, the world powers had history of attempts in trying to integrate the Philippines into their respective empires. Japan, in the 16th century under Hideyoshi Toyotomi, tried to exact tribute from the Philippines. As late as 1894, Prince Aritomo Yamagata, Japan's commanding general in the Sino-Japanese War and twice prime minister, made an offer of 40 million in pound sterling to acquire the Philippines. Britain, on the other hand, once held territory in the Philippines in 1762 as part of actions taken against Spain in the Seven Years' War. Germany also had processes ongoing, starting with the acquisition of Carolinas in 1885 and the Marianas in 1899. Both the Carolinas and the Marianas were attached to the Philippines under Spanish colonial rule. Not only so, the Germans also worked on negotiations with the Sulu Sultanate. France, which by the time ruled much of mainland Southeast Asia as Indochina, also saw opportunity in the Philippines. Even beyond the countries which immediately sent their forces, others such as Belgium also had historical intentions in acquiring the Philippines as a colony. However, as history goes, none of these powers would pursue colonial possession of the troubled archipelago.
Perhaps the saturation of colonies prevented the world powers from ever acting more than sending a contingent to look after their own people in the Philippines. Events in China after the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform in September 1898, among others, shifted their governments' attention from the questionable position of the Philippines. Also, by leaving the Philippines to the United States, the competing powers somehow assured that at least none of them would be able to wreck the balance of power in the region. The eventual victory of the Americans, which at the time was not pressed elsewhere after Spain's loss and Cuban independence, did not come immediately as well. It took them until 1902, four years after Manila Bay, to officially declare their war against the emerging Filipino republic over. Even then, it would take another 11 years to completely pacify the Philippines. In particular, fighting against Macario Sakay's Tagalog Republic and the Moros of Mindanao stretched American military resources even after the formal end of the Philippine-American War. The struggle of the United States in the Philippines, spanning a total of almost 15 years since the Battle of Manila Bay, may well be among the longest active conflicts in American history, next only to the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. If a world power such as the United States, already powerful enough to beat Spain in a matter of months, took long enough to enforce peace in the Philippines, one may just imagine how other colonial governments might have fared in administering the archipelago. On the other hand, a Philippines divided by the world powers would have had long-term effects as well. At the least, while yesterday is history, people can always learn from the lessons of the past in trying to chart in the present different possible futures in terms of defense, international relations, and foreign policy.
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