Triple Threat? The Three Kings of Luzon

Present-day depiction of the Three Kings
Photo courtesy of SEASite

The epithet "Three Kings" has been handed down as a term pertaining to the "wise men" (magi, μάγοι) who paid homage to the infant Jesus, and gave their gifts. They have become an institution come Christmas season. While the Bible does not indicate any absolute number for the wise men or what their names really were (see Matthew 2), tradition continues to hold that there is at least one king for each gift: gold, frankincense, and myrrh. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, there were also "Three Kings" who may seem insignificant in our history books today, but who also once held significant influence in the Luzon area. These kings would be Don Francisco Maniago, Don Andres Malong, and Don Pedro Almazan. Who were they, and how did they become kings?

Map of Northern Luzon (circa 1625)
Photo courtesy of San Nicolas Municipal Library

The King of Pampanga
In October 1660, Francisco Maniago (or Mañago) took up the banner of revolt in Pampanga. This was in response to the punitive polo y servicio (polo, or forced labor), which depleted the working population of the province. For eight months, perhaps starting February of the same year, some 1,000 Kapampangans were recruited to cut timber for shipbuilding. It is estimated that the population then under Spanish control in the entire Philippines numbered around 700,000 to 800,000, making the 1,000 figure relatively significant. Comparing the proportion to 2017 figures, it will mean mobilizing more than a hundred thousand Filipinos. According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, planting season in the region goes from May to August (first cropping), and from November to April (second cropping). Meanwhile, harvest season goes from August to November (first cropping), and from February to July (second cropping). Considering this, it seems that not only were the Kapampangans not allowed to harvest for the past season (February-July), they were also not allowed to plant for a new season (May-August). As a result, starvation spread throughout the province, since what little the province could produce was acquired by the Spanish for its provisions. To make matters worse, they were not paid for their contribution of food, which was assessed to be 24,000 bushels of rice for the year. The amount requested to compensate exceeded 200,000 pesos. Assuming three percent (3%) annual inflation appreciated this value for a period covering 1660 and 2017, then its present value would be equivalent to some 7.6 billion pesos. This computation does not even include the effects of foreign exchange and other factors as it only assumes that average annual inflation stood at three percent. This is hardly a meager sum, which almost makes it feel like a sort of scam, and understandably an immediate reason for the revolt.

Bust of Francisco Maniago
Photo courtesy of Pampanga Talents

As for Maniago himself, he was a leader of Mexico, Pampanga, serving as the town's maestro de campo (master of camp). The revolt began with a conspiracy among the workers' lodges. From there, they built their force, with Maniago putting up his position at Lubao. Another sizable force assembled in Bacolor. Meanwhile, the Spanish forces began to move. Headed personally by the Governor-General Sabiniano Manrique de Lara (ruled 1653-1663), the 300-strong detachment bearing four artillery guns (four-pounders) set up their position in Macabebe. To further visualize this arrangement, Lubao and Macabebe were separated only by the Pampanga River Basin, a distance of around 12 kilometers. The mere presence of the governor-general himself signified the gravity of the Maniago threat, as the Spanish would later note that the Kapampangans were "the most warlike and prominent people of these islands." In addition, de Lara figured that he could easily persuade some of the Kapampangans not to join the rebellion by a simple show of force. Among those who joined the Spanish fold were Don Francisco Salonga of Macabebe, and Don Juan Macapagal of Arayat. Macapagal may be a familiar name, since he is a descendant of Lakan Dula, and the ancestor of two former Filipino presidents: Diosdado Macapagal and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. To prove their loyalty, Salonga let the governor-general reside in his home, and Macapagal had the rebel envoy sent to him killed. As the Spanish began to coalesce their native contingent, Maniago also began to consolidate his support. He sent messages to the rest of the Pampanga leaders to join forces with him. He also sent messages to the leaders of Cagayan, Ilocos, Pangasinan, and Zambales to follow their example, and elect their own kings. The revolt began to feature a series of deals and alliances. As the Spanish saw themselves gaining the upper hand in the race to gather the support of the Pampanga leaders, de Lara decided to negotiate a possible resolution to the conflict without having to resort to a clash of forces. With this in mind, he offered 14,000 pesos as compensation. While this is still a large amount, it barely meets the original demand of 200,000 pesos. Thus, what were added to the offer would be personal rewards to the leaders, and amnesty to their followers. Soon enough, the leaders began to waver in their resolve. The governor-general addressed the leaders who abandoned the revolt:

I cannot deny that in demanding the payment of what was due you, you asked what was just; but as little can you deny that you did not ask it in a just way. Not only because, when the manner in which you act must be so costly both to yourselves and to the king, he who solicits justice by such means is the aggressor, more cruel than is justice, perverting peace and introducing war, but because in war all the wealth that one had intended to increase is destroyed; and it is more cruel than kind to employ, in order to show anger at the wealth which recognizes a debt, what will cause the ruin of property and lives. Who has ever grown rich through war? and who has not lost in war that which in peace he held secure?

Later on, Maniago himself discussed with de Lara, resulting to the former accompanying the triumphant governor-general back to Manila. In return, he was appointed maestro de campo representing his province, which denotes that he was the chief of staff of the governor-general. Later on, Maniago was hanged in Mexico. As Renato Constantino (1975) would note, the Maniago revolt became a "non-revolt" in the sense that it became a war of persuasion. Tongues and pens proved mightier than swords and guns. In addition, while de Lara seemed content to have the prime instigator of the rebellion out of the scene, he saw that the threat had not been completely dissolved in Pampanga. Therefore, he agreed to build forts in Lubao and Arayat.

Mural of Andres Malong's revolt
Photo courtesy of the NCCA

The King of Pangasinan
Nevertheless, the struggles of the Spanish colonial administration was far from over. In December 1660, Andres Malong (or Malóng) raised the banner of revolt in Pangasinan. What was seen as the immediate cause of the revolt is the desire to overthrow the Spanish, albeit replacing them as the ruling clique. Malong hails from Binalatongan (now San Carlos), and served as the village's maestro de campo (master of camp). Unlike Maniago, who waited to consolidate his forces, Malong immediately took action by attacking the provincial capital of Lingayen, killing all the Spanish they could find. Among those killed were the governor of the province (alcalde mayor), Francisco Gomez Pulido, and the chief of police (alguazil mayor), Nicolas de Campo. They also attacked the town of Bagnotan. The early success of Malong's moves compelled him to crown himself as the King of Pangasinan and Zambales. At this point, he amassed a following of at least 4,000. Another account even places it at 8,000. Again, taking account of the proportion of this following to the estimated Filipino population by this time, this is equivalent to mobilizing around a million Filipinos in terms of 2017 figures. Meanwhile, he made his key appointments. Among them was Pedro Gumapos of Agoo, who he gave the title of Count (conde), and then sent him with a part of his forces (mainly composed of Sambals) to Ilocos in order to begin a rebellion there. Soon enough, the 3,000-strong force headed by Gumapos attacked Agoo and Bauang, which later fell into their hands. With this success, the force under Gumapos further increased to around 5,000. Recalling the attack on Bagnotan, a number of translators tend to relate it with Bacnotan, which is now part of La Union. In the semantic sense, it may be plausible, but not in the chronological sense. Bacnotan is further north of Lingayen (c. 100 kilometers), Agoo (c. 50 kilometers away), and Bauang (c. 30 kilometers away). Meanwhile, there is the notion that Bagnotan is actually Dagupan, and this may make sense, since Lingayen is near Dagupan in geographical terms (c. 10 kilometers away).

Five days within his success at Lingayen and Bagnotan, he sent a message to Maniago, urging him to take action or he would send an expedition led by one of his generals, Melchor de Vera. The expedition was said to be composed of a 6,000-strong force. Since Maniago did not offer a favorable response, as he was already negotiating with de Lara, Malong decided to send the expeditionary force. Again, this is a significant figure, considering the population of the Philippines at the time, and the number of troops the Spanish can actually muster (which was 300, as exhibited by the Maniago experience). Of course, it is also possible that the Spanish are bloating their figures to portray a valiant disposition on their part. Still, provided we take the figures at face value, it can be said that Malong's threat is indeed significant. Constantino believes that Malong's difference is his capability to tap the participation of the masses, observing the number of people rallying to him. Nevertheless, the Spanish also tend to underestimate the quality of the opposing forces: "This assertion was not a false one; for so great was the multitude of adherents who were coming to him—some attracted by the novelty, others by their eagerness for plunder, and others by inconstancy or fear." As such, unlike that with Maniago, there is no mention of de Lara leading the troops personally to deal with Malong. Instead, what assembled to take down Malong was a force of 300, thirty of which were Kapampangans, under the commands of General Francisco de Esteybar and General Felipe de Ugalde. The 100-strong force under de Ugalde set up their position at Bolinao, some 70 kilometers away from Lingayen, while the 200-strong force under de Esteybar set up their position at Arayat.

It seems like de Esteybar was content to sit out the situation, sending only scout troops to harass de Vera while retreating. As for de Vera, who was reported to have marched through Porac on his way to Arayat, it seems like he decided to catch de Esteybar, who moved from Arayat to Magalang, since he calculated his superior standing against the Spanish. However, he did not seem to observe the fatigue of his troops, which tended to run circles around Pampanga as they chased de Esteybar's troops. Apparently, the plan was to lure the larger force of de Vera out of Pangasinan, while tiring them as they are kept within Pampanga. Soon, de Vera interpreted the incessant retreat of de Esteybar as symbol of his victory, even though he was unable to face de Esteybar's main force in battle. Thus, he went back to Malong to report his success, with their expedition killing more than 1,000 enemies, many of which were Kapampangans. Encouraged by the successes of Gumapos and de Vera, he sent another force totaling 4,000 under the command of Jacinto Makasiag (or Macasiag) of Binalatongan to bring Ilocos in his dominion. With him as sub-commanders were Count Gumapos and Marcos Makasiag.

However, the fault of Malong surfaced with his distribution of forces. It was said that he left only 2,000 with him in Pangasinan, whereas the province is larger than Pampanga and Ilocos combined in terms of area. Meanwhile, the Spanish concentrated their small force. Thus, de Ugalde was able to liberate the province with such speed that by January 1661, only Malanguey (Bayambang) and Binalatongan (San Carlos) remained under Malong's influence. When they had cornered Malong, de Esteybar combined his forces with those of de Ugalde. This portrays de Vera's report as an exaggeration, since he faced no more than 30 of de Esteybar's troops, giving Malong a false sense of security. Facing de Esteybar's troops must have surprised the confident Malong, who probably thought their expedition to Pampanga rendered the enemy incapable to fight. As a last resort, Malong burned Binalatongan as he escaped to the mountains. The Spanish followed the rebel force, killing some 500 in the process. While Malong was nowhere to be found, the Spanish went to reorganize Lingayen. While there, a number of rebels began to surrender to the Spanish. In exchange for their pardon, the returnees betrayed Malong's location. As soon as Malong and his associates were captured, they were executed. Malong was shot while seated on a stone. His associates de Vera and Francisco de Pacadua were hanged at Binalatongan.

As for Malong's remaining forces further north, they were supposed to face a readier resistance. Knowing Malong's intent to take Ilocos within his sphere of influence, the governor of the province, Alonso de Peralta, called for a war council in Vigan. They assigned the ensign (alferez) Lorenzo Arqueros to lead the expedition to the south, accompanied by the maestro de campo Lorenzo Peding and Pedro Lopez. As they reached Bauang, they found nobody to oppose them. From there, they moved to Aringay, only to find the same situation. They did push on enough to find the father of Gumapos, Miguel Carreño, who served as a spy, and the leader of the few Zambals who remained in the area. Soon, Arqueros had Carreño hanged. When Arqueros reported success, the governor went to aid him from Namacpacan (Luna). The combined Ilocano-Spanish force assembled at Agoo numbered around 1,500. However, on the other side, the Zambal force numbered around 5,000. Arqueros and Peralta decided not to attack, but Peding and Lopez thought otherwise, since they possessed firearms. Commanding a hundred troops, Peding and Lopez attacked the rebel forces on their own. While the rest of the Ilocano-Spanish force rushed to their aid, they were unable to prevent the deaths of Peding and Lopez in battle. Isabelo de los Reyes (1890) writes that these two Ilocano leaders are among the most honored heroes of Ilocos as they achieved a feat even greater than that of Miguel Vicos and Pedro Becbec. At any rate, the combined force suffered losses, and they ultimately fled northward.

Spanish bearing an arquebus
Photo courtesy of the Encyclopedia of Weapons

By this time, the logical target of the marching Zambal force is Vigan. Observing this development, Arqueros and Peralta set up their defenses at Narvacan and Santa, some 140 kilometers north of Agoo. One can only visualize how far the combined force was pushed back by Malong's expedition. When news of Malong's impending defeat reached Ilocos, the Zambals have already went past Narvacan and have entered Vigan. On January 22, 1661, Juan Celiboto assumed the position of governor of Vigan. The triumphant Zambals led by Gumapos and Makasiag reached as far as Baduc (Badoc), which was around 40 kilometers north of Vigan. Meanwhile, Arqueros and the combined force made it difficult for the rebels to break through Cagayan, as the Spanish began to incorporate Cagayano troops in their fold. Makasiag also began to recruit Ilocanos, and some 300 have joined. On January 31, Makasiag received a message from Malong requesting his aid against the Spanish. In Malong's words, they are to put an end to the "Spanish rabble," and all their leaders must witness this. While on their way to Pangasinan, they were met by the forces of de Esteybar at Santa Cruz and Santa Lucia (c. 70 kilometers south of Vigan). By this time, the Zambals learned of the collapse of Malong's forces in Pangasinan, which disheartened them. As the Spanish gained ground, the Zambals were routed. Despite being inferior in numbers, the Spanish also possessed arms which the Zambals gravely lacked. More than 400 from Makasiag's force died, with almost the rest of the survivors being captured. Makasiag himself was hanged.

Crown of Mary made in Colombia
Photo courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art

The King of Ilocos
Perhaps taking advantage of Malong's uprising, Pedro Almazan (or Almasán) led a revolt in Ilocos. Hailing from San Nicolas, Almazan responded to Malong's call, and made his own moves. In December 1660, he formed an alliance with Juan Magsanop of Bangi (Bangui), and the mayor (gobernadorcillo) of Laoag, Gaspar Cristobal. To formalize their alliance, Almazan had one of his sons married to one of Cristobal's daughters. They were regarded to have much influence, they were able to recruit the Calanasanes from Apayao for their cause. As they built up their force, Almazan took the initiative to be crowned King of Ilocos, and as his symbol of authority, the Crown of Mary (the "Queen of Angels") was stolen from the Laoag Church (now Laoag Cathedral) for Almazan's use. As heirs to throne were the married Almazan's son and Cristobal's daughter.

When they learned of the success of Malong's expedition, which have been recalled to Pangasinan by the end of January 1661, they calculated that they must have a free hand to conquer the areas left by the Zambals. However, before taking action, Magsanop communicated with Cristobal. The latter's answer was the burning of the Laoag Church. Immediately after receiving Cristobal's response, Magsanop hastily declared the independence of Bakarra (Bacarra), and the kingship of Almazan over Ilocos. As their forces rushed to the villages of Pata and Cabicungan (now parts of Claveria, c. 110 kilometers from Bacarra), no opposition met them, and their numbers increased. As Almazan's forces attacked Cagayan, Malong's forces left Narvacan. With the Zambals out of the picture, the Spanish forces in Ilocos attempted to concentrate their efforts on Almazan. By the beginning of February, Arqueros and a 1,000-strong force of Cagayanos, Ilocanos, and Spanish marched to Bacarra. Meanwhile, maestro de campo Juan Manalo and a 300-strong force marched to Cagayan. After a number of days into February 1661, Arqueros and Manalo were able to reduce the rebel forces. The captured Magsanop committed suicide. As for Almazan, he was hanged in Vigan. However, according to a later account by Fr. Casimiro Diaz, Almazan was able to escape, went mad, and died in his rage. Cristobal's fate was not mentioned in later records. When de Esteybar arrived after his victory against the Zambals, the rebellion in Ilocos was over.

Significance of the Three Kings
While they remain footnotes in most history textbooks to this day, there are a number of lessons to be learned from these kings. First to note is the bad faith of the Spanish, which was best exhibited in the case of Maniago. Instead of keeping their promise of amnesty, the rebel leaders were executed. This reveals something in the Filipino psyche by this time. There is the notion that Maniago, Malong, and Almazan commanded charismatic leadership, and in this sense, their followers were supposed to have gravitated to their cause because of their personality, and less for what the cause really was. To begin with, the three were principalia, or elites. Following this logic, it would also mean that the great numbers of people who followed them were incorporated into an elite-cadre relationship. When the leaders are gone, the followers scatter like sheep without a shepherd. This implies the level of interaction between the administrators and the administered by the 1660s, which is the absolute dependence of the administered to their administrators. Is it possible that these kings saw themselves as their people's saviors, or it was their followers who elevated them as such?

Meanwhile, if we are to think that the Filipino people by this time were not too inclined to join because of charisma, then there must be some legitimacy and rationale behind the revolts. For one, the people wanted to choose their own leaders, even if it meant a changing of elites, rather than a change in government type. This implies that even by this time, less than a century since the Spanish began colonizing the archipelago, there existed an aspiration to be ruled by someone from their own, not by someone appointed by a king ruling half a world away. That is, the pride of self-governance. In relation to this, the people experienced both short-term and long-term triggers to cause them to spring to action, which is evident in all of the three revolts. In this case, even if the people had different leaders, they would still act as they do since the cause is justified in their minds. What can they gain from rebel victory? Why they did become rebels in the first place? Apparently, the long-term trigger is the aspiration to overthrow the colonizer and gain independence, as witnessed in Malong's and Almazan's experiences, which explains the killing of the Spanish. Yet, there are also followers who remained on the Spanish side. In addition, the rebels did not kill Spanish troops only, and not because they were local recruits of the Spanish. There are also rebel leaders who spared the religious, even if they were Spanish. For instance, while Gumapos was quick to attack friars, Makasiag remains respectful of them. In turn, they become opposites who tend to balance each other. Also, this is a significant difference in objectives. Perhaps there are more reasons than one to compel people to rebel. Meanwhile, the personal ambitions of the three kings may have been amplified by their following, not solely by their own vanity as the Spanish would have portrayed them, because as witnessed in all these rebellions, followers create leaders. If only the leaders were self-absorbed of their features, their followers may have easily been swayed. This leads to further search for an overarching cause that had driven these three kings into revolt.

Spanish Formosa
Photo courtesy of Wikipedia

Another lesson to note is the Filipino sense of timeliness, which may well debunk the later notion of "Filipino Time" as referring to being late. What was the situation by this time? One development is the Eighty Years War, which was fought between the Spanish and the Dutch. Ending by 1648, the Philippines was not spared by the Dutch onslaught. For a number of times, in 1600, 1610, 1617, 1624, and 1646, the Dutch attacked the Philippines. While they failed to conquer the archipelago, as the Dutch only had one victory out of five battles, they also made some gains such as the conquest of Formosa (Taiwan) from the Spanish in 1642. Had it not been for the Dutch, it may be speculated that Formosa became Philippine territory, as the Spanish ruled the isles from Manila. Also, despite their victories, the Dutch attacks revealed the grave inadequacy in colonial security. For instance, in 1646, the Spanish only had four ships (two in good condition) to combat the 19 ships of the Dutch. This compelled the colonial administration to strengthen the archipelago's defenses, starting with shipbuilding, and the recruitment of the local population into the colonial armed forces. This depleted the labor force and the resources of the Philippines, making it a short-term trigger for the revolts. This also meant that the Spanish were exhausted from defending against the Dutch, even as the war formally ended in 1648, for they continued building up the armed forces as of 1660. Evidently, Governor-General de Lara's force of 300 troops is adequate proof of the Spanish capability. It is not that he did not see the Pangasinan and the Ilocos revolts significant enough for him to personally command the Spanish forces, since he did send the 300 up north with de Esteybar and de Ugalde anyway. It is an indicator of how weak the defense of the islands have become. Pampanga is nearer to Manila than Ilocos or Pangasinan. If he were to leave the capital with most of the armed forces, Manila would become an easy target for the rebels, and this is a risk he cannot take. The maneuvers in Pampanga, and the massive recruitment of locals also showed that the colonial administration was more concerned in preserving their own core troops, indicating this was all Spain could offer to defend the Philippines. Concentrating their forces may be considered a stroke of genius on the part of the Spanish leaders, who seem to know the difference between courage and recklessness as seen in the incident involving Peding and Lopez. Meanwhile, even though the three kings calculated correctly the weakness of the Spanish forces, they did not seem to consider the capacity of the Spanish to "divide and conquer." For instance, we saw Zambals and Ilocanos, as well as Pangasinense and Kapampangans, fighting against each other. In the context of Spanish colonization, this is an old tactic which the rebels were unable to overcome.

Portrait of Zheng Chenggong
Photo courtesy of Wikipedia

In addition, despite having the Dutch threat neutralized with the end of the war, another challenge arose. The Chinese pirate Zheng Chenggong (or Koxinga, Coxinga, Kuesing, Coseng, Koxingka, Tehing-Tehingcorg) threatened the Philippines after his conquest of Formosa from the Dutch in 1661. The pirate had acquired great reputation as he led Ming forces against the Qing from 1646. His largest battle was in 1659, when he commanded 100,000 troops to take Nanjing (Nanking). Also, despite his opposition to the Qing, his conquest of Formosa for the Chinese was regarded as a heroic act. As he settled in Formosa, he conducted raids in Luzon, and then demanded tribute from the colonial government in Manila. Yet, the Spanish refused. Instead, they built their defenses in Cavite, Zamboanga, and Sulu. They were also forced to abandon their holding in Ternate, which was in the Moluccas (Maluku), to consolidate their forces in the Philippines. As a preventive measure, the Spanish killed a number of Chinese for them not to join Zheng Chenggong when he attacks the Philippines. This divided the focus of the Spanish forces further. Again, the three kings calculated correctly the weakness of the Spanish forces, and capitalized on it by taking action. However, the threat remained potential. The pirate died in 1662. He was unable to carry out his attack. By this time, the three kings have been taken down as well. Also, the planned defenses have been abandoned to cut spending. Of course, this adds as evidence to the sense of timeliness of the Filipino leaders.

The fact that these three kings went down in history signifies that they posed real threat to the Spanish colonial administration. There are instances wherein rebels and subversives never get recorded, or their feats downgraded. Yet, even with these considerations, we see an account saying Malong commanded as many as 40,000 people. Apparently, there are more to their narratives than meets the naked eye. Even though they were remembered as rebels, we can take another look, and witness that even rebels are humans, too. It is worth noting that we had three kings who stood up against the colonial armed forces, and fought for independence.

See the references here.