For Whom The Bell Tolls: The Cost of the Balangiga Conflict
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| The reunited Balangiga bells set foot on Philippine soil in 2018 Photo courtesy of ABS-CBN News |
(For Whom The Bell Tolls, Ernest Hemingway)
On December 11, 2018, the Balangiga Bells have been returned by the United States to the Philippines. In all, three bells were returned. The smaller bell, which has a mouth diamater of around 20 inches, was formerly located in Camp Red Cloud, an American military base in Uijeongbu, Republic of Korea (South Korea). The two larger bells, having mouth diameters of around 27 inches and 31 inches respectively, were formerly located at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The bells have long been regarded by some as a symbol of captive nationalism, wherein the colonial masters have triumphed over its colonies in both material and spirit. For those who may not be too spiritual, the bells are being considered as war booty. The Americans merely wanted to have tangible evidence of their specific victory, and the specific incident they won is what is now called the Balangiga Massacre or the Balangiga Conflict. What led to the exile of the bells? Also, why has a small-scale conflict in a Samar town of seemingly little significance to the overall course of the war escalated to more than a century old crack in Philippine-American relations? A lot has been written about the incident, and this may just be another Balangiga article.
The Filipino tactical ambush
By 1901, the Philippine-American War was virtually over. On March 23, after more than a year of disappearing from the public eye, President Emilio Aguinaldo was captured, and uncertainty reigned in the chain of command. The next ranking general, Miguel Malvar, effectively commanded only the Filipino forces in Batangas. Nevertheless, with most of the high command eliminated or captured, Malvar was authorized by the Hong Kong Junta to assume the presidency in April. Fighting also continued elsewhere. In Samar and Leyte, the Filipino forces were consolidated under the command of General Vicente Lukban (one of Aguinaldo's appointees), who formerly served as commander of the forces in Bicol. However, being in the periphery of the war, Lukban was allocated few troops and equipment. Perhaps fortunately for Lukban, he also had to contend with a relatively small American force. When General Jacob Hurd Smith initially assumed command of the American forces, he was appalled by its size. Troops numbered a little under 1,000. For a province with a population of more than 266,000 (as of 1903), Smith believed that the American garrison in Samar was at a disadvantage. Provided the Samareño population leaned in sympathy with Lukban's forces, opposition against the Americans have the potential to significantly increase. Then again, the American forces in general cannot fully focus their efforts further south. At least 4,000 Filipino soldiers coalesced under Malvar's command, who were able to gather as much as 10,000 rifles to arm the so-called "Liberation Army." With Batangas being geographically closer to the capital, Manila, Malvar posed greater threat at the time. By November 1901, the Batangas situation was described as a stalemate.
When compared to the Batangas situation, the theater of war in Samar appeared insignificant. This is despite Samar having almost as large a population as Batangas. The latter had a population of more than 257,000 (as of 1903). At least not until the morning of September 28, 1901. A 500-strong Filipino force ambushed the American forces located in the church and the municipal hall of Balangiga, a town with a population of around 5,000. It was said the Americans were just about to take their breakfast. The Balangiga bells were used as a signal for the attack. Abanador's assault of an American soldier also served as a signal for the attack. In the American perspective, it was a massacre. Commentators usually compare the incident with the Battle of Little Big Horn, a part of the Great Sioux War in 1876, wherein 268 soldiers were killed in their fight against Native Americans. Company C of the 9th Infantry suffered heavy casualties. Out of 74 troops, 36 were killed in action (KIA), eight were severely wounded (they would die later on), and four were missing in action (MIA). Only 26 survived, of which four were unscathed. The ambush appeared to have focused on the American officers, which the Filipinos have attacked with "ferocity unusual even for guerrilla warfare," as noted by Colonel Thomas Bruno. Then again, despite their numerical superiority, the Filipinos suffered 28 deaths and 22 wounded. In the Filipino perspective, it was a rare victory, albeit a tactical victory. They took 100 rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition. Even the most optimistic of American estimates cannot cover for the results of the ambush, a practice which appeared to be associated with early American campaigns. Perhaps as a saving act, the Americans reported that they took down with them 150 out of the 400 Filipino troops. This was definitely a false number.
Confusion and retaliation
In reality, Lukban might have been as shocked as the Americans when he and his compatriots learned of the Balangiga conflict. With around a thousand troops for the entire province, and less than half of them armed with rifles, Lukban cannot hope at the time to assemble 500 troops for the ambush. Worse, the American media tagged Lukban as the mastermind of the attack. Then again, perhaps wanting to take advantage of the situation, Lukban issued letters encouraging all forces aligned to the Filipino cause to follow the example of Balangiga. This was in conjunction with Malvar's call for coordinated offensives at the remaining resistance areas in November 1901 as attempts to break the stalemate. Then again, if it was not Lukban's idea, who organized the engagement at Balangiga? More recent research such as that of Rolando Borrinaga credit the coordinated attack to the local chief of police, Valeriano Abanador, and two of Lukban's officers, namely Captain Eugenio Daza, and Sergeant Pedro Duran, Sr. For one, Abanador was one of the least suspect for his befriending of the Americans. He even played chess with one of the officers of Company C, Major Richard Sill Grisworld, the company's surgeon. Apparently, it was an entirely Balangiga plot, and none of Lukban's men in the area even informed their commander. Of course, there are logistical and communication reasons. It took around a week before news of the Balangiga conflict reached Lukban. While in the strict military sense, this may qualify for insubordination, Lukban's promotion of Balangiga's success made it appear that he is not entirely opposed to the idea, at least in theory. Both the American and the Filipino forces were scattered over the province, so one cannot expect any large-scale engagements to occur. Also, since Aguinaldo disbanded the regular army in November 1899, Filipino forces usually operated in guerrilla groups. Even Malvar's command is nowhere near the size of armies commanded in the opening phase of the Philippine-American War by Antonio Luna.
Meanwhile, backlash from the United States became bloated and exaggerated as the Balangiga Massacre. The media began to have its attention on Samar, so much so that President Theodore Roosevelt himself said, "[I] am deeply chagrined at the disagreement which aside from unfortunate results in
the Philippines may also have unfortunate results here. I most earnestly wish to
have this question settled in the Philippines." The military command in Samar had been paying attention, too. Smith in particular was furious. While in a way, this was his ticket to actually be granted the reinforcements he was requesting, Smith viewed Filipinos as a lower and more savage race than the Native Americans he faced in the United States. As a colonel assigned in Luzon two years prior, Smith was known to have captured enemies shot at their hands. Smith also tried his hand at religious affairs, particularly in an incident at Dagupan. In addition, he was particularly proud of his harshness, a policy the Americans in general wanted to avoid in their pursuit of benevolent assimilation. Of course, Company C were battle-hardened soldiers fresh from the American campaign in China (they arrived in Samar on August 11, 1901). In particular, they fought the Boxers. In their mind, the annihilation of such crack troops, even due to a surprise attack, must have not resulted in a terrific defeat. As expected, Smith began to receive the troops he wanted. The Sixth Separate Brigade was composed of 4,000 troops, wherein seven companies (around 700) were formed by Filipino recruits. This made possible the devastating response Smith was planning. In his order to Major Littleton W. T. Waller, who commanded a battalion of 315 Marines, Smith said,
When Waller asked the minimum age as his reference, Smith said it would be ten years old, limiting the criteria to all males who can bear arms. With this command, Smith was stretching the limits of the Lieber Code, also known as General Order No. 100. Originating from the American Civil War, the Lieber Code was modeled after European standards of war, wherein ethical considerations are mandated during wartime. The code predates the Hague Convention (1899) and the Geneva Convention (1929). However, when implemented for the Philippine-American War, only an abridged version was issued for the United States military. This oversight may have been a contributor to the perception among American commanders that such brutal tactics were even possible. In the observation of Major Brian McCarthy, while some American commentators have applauded the effectiveness of such counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla warfare, others have criticized the severe brutality which were employed for the sake of ending the war. In addition, Smith issued a declaration to the local leaders in Samar and Leyte to cooperate with the Americans. He also accused the influential and affluent people of secretly aiding the Filipino forces, alienating many of the elites in Samar and Leyte. Again, this is a departure from America's official policy.
Investigating the American strategy
Among Smith's officers, it seemed that Major Waller's case was the one which gained widespread coverage. His infamous "March across Samar" caused the deaths of at least 39 Filipinos, 11 of which were porters shot in January 1902 for refusal to help their expedition, and allegedly attempted treachery against the Americans. Even while Smith's campaign in Samar continued, Waller was already facing court martial in Manila. Beginning in March 1902, the 13-officer military court was chaired by General William Bisbee. Waller appealed that while he did commit such acts, he cannot be held liable for them provided that the United States Army had already relocated him and his unit in Cavite. Thus, the Army did not have the jurisdiction to actually prosecute him. There was also a speculation that Waller was being harassed by his fellow officers for reporting success in the Samar campaign. In November 1901, military engagement against Lukban's forces in Basey resulted in an American victory. Eventually, upon agreement by President Roosevelt, Waller was acquitted. While Waller continued in service, distinguishing himself in the border war against Mexico, some believed that his court martial cost him a possible promotion as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the highest rank in the Marines.
Meanwhile, Waller's case caused uproar back at home, especially among anti-imperialists. It brought to fore the commander of the war in Samar, General Smith, whose turn to face the court martial came on April 21, 1902. Unlike Waller, who softened Smith's "kill and burn" order as applicable only to "insurgents" during his expedition, Smith himself was already known for his harsh policies as a military officer, as well as his reckless talk among fellow officers. His order to Waller earned him the moniker "Howling Wilderness" as symbolic of his middle initial (H), as well as the nickname "Hell-Roaring Jake." For critics, it was a no-brainer to render the guilty verdict on Smith, even if he used Waller's case as a precedent for acquittal. However, similar to Waller's case, there was speculation that the court martial was an attempt to dampen Smith's success in Samar, and that the general had already expended its usefulness. In the words of General Adna Chaffee, "General Smith has worked very hard in Samar but I cannot say that he
has always worked with good judgment, particularly so when he first took
command of the Brigade." On February 18, 1902, Lukban was captured and sentenced to imprisonment in Bilibid. A little over two months later, on April 27, General Claro Guevarra, Lukban's successor, surrendered with 744 troops, 65 of which are officers. Malvar, reputed by most history textbooks as the "last general to surrender" during the war, actually surrendered in Batangas earlier than Guevarra, on April 13. Even before Smith's court martial, the Samar campaign was virtually over. Smith's successor in Samar, General Frederick Dent Grant, appeared to have no major objections to his predecessor's methods.
As expected, in light of testimonies by more officers other than Waller's, Smith was handed down the guilty verdict, but not for the killing of Filipino civilians through a military campaign. He was sentenced to be "admonished by the reviewing authority" in the sense that the evidence presented in court showed that "the accused did not mean everything that his unexplained language implied, that his subordinates did not gather such a meaning, and the orders were not executed in such sense." In sum, the court martial saw that the American soldiers killed less people than what was credited of them, and Smith can only be held liable for his improper or "uncivilized" conduct of a military campaign. One of the earliest estimates of Filipino deaths in the war over Samar was from an American historian, Kenneth Ray Young. In 1977, he put the estimate at 50,000 people, a number which was carried on by subsequent Filipino historians. Considering the population of Samar at the time, it was indeed a massacre. In the Filipino perspective, this is the Balangiga Massacre, as emphasized by Teodoro Agoncillo. However, the court officially placed the death count at 425, all of them being "insurgents." Later estimates also presented conservative estimates. In 1979, David Fritz placed the death toll at around 2,000 through the use of population ageing techniques. Meanwhile, Bob Couttie in 2004 placed the death toll at around 2,500 to 3,000, but this was not only confined to Smith's order. This figure represented Filipino deaths for the entire Samar campaign. In addition, Couttie noticed a flaw in the estimation methods used prior. For instance, the Spanish census takers have conflicting population estimates for the entire Philippines. Thus, when compared with the American census, there would be issues in tracing the population dynamics of any province. It could result with an amazingly small number, or a severely high number. As he put it in a 2005 interview, the 50,000 death estimate was "pure bunk and is totally wrong." Couttie noted how the Samar population even increased during wartime despite accounting population loss. Filipino historian Rolando Borrinaga also agrees with more recent estimates, stating that the allegation of 15,000 disappearances during Smith's command in Samar was unfounded. Meanwhile, the 50,000 figure appears to be connected to the dislocation caused by Smith's campaign. Colonel Bruno discussed how the American strategy of creating concentration areas, as seen also in the remaining theaters of war such as Batangas and Marinduque, caused this dispersion. However, while the Batangas campaign under General Franklin Bell was acclaimed as the more successful one, albeit causing dislocation by even more people (estimated at around 100,000 were made homeless), Smith's campaign in particular was highlighted for its sheer brutality. It led to his retirement.
Justification of the conflict
Whether the Americans killed 50 or 50,000 Filipinos, it was not entirely a matter of numbers. The central point that cannot be revised by any statistical or historical method was that military personnel ignored ethical considerations of war and took action against unarmed civilians. Then again, careful consideration is deserved by Smith's subordinates. Of course, there are a number of reasons why they did not seem to carry out Smith's order to make Samar a "howling wilderness." For one, the Filipino forces moved from place to place, as expected of guerrilla warfare, and the Samareño population appeared sympathetic to the Filipino cause. This made it difficult for the Americans to ascertain friend from foe, especially when all officers have the same perspective as Waller's, and it stretched the American logistical requirements. Samar is the third largest island in the Philippines, following Luzon and Mindanao. Another consideration might be the American faith. Even as soldiers, most of the Americans sent here were Protestants. There had been instances wherein soldiers refused to kill because of their religious leanings. Lastly, the court finding might have some merit. Smith's officers did not take their commanding officer seriously, presumably because of his character. Provided that Smith usually talked as he did, then discretion on the part of his officers can be considered for their inaction. However, their ethical considerations appeared limited to the killing part. Many American soldiers in Samar still carried out the burn order, causing homelessness for around 50,000 people who saw their houses demolished. In addition, the court martial proceedings show that 19 towns and 206 boats were destroyed. Who knows how many more Filipinos were killed indirectly due to these devastation tactics? Ultimately, the Americans took the Balangiga Bells to the United States. This act symbolized their vindication from their worst defeat during the Philippine-American War.
What about the Filipino action? Unlike the American campaign, the Filipinos under Abanador specifically targeted American soldiers. There was no compelling evidence that the ambush involved American civilians, demonstrating that the Filipino sense of conducting war may have been softer than the Americans, and advanced of its time. This was exemplified by Apolinario Mabini's response to Luna's policy against civilians who allegedly aided the enemy. Then again, there must have been a triggering incident to spark the Balangiga Conflict. According to Borrinaga's study, the Filipinos resisted starvation, imprisonment, and public shaming experienced due to the American actions. These incidents are not confined to Samar. Nevertheless, it showed that the Filipinos would not take military action without reason. In a sense, it was the Filipino response which appeared more of a retaliation than Smith's campaign, and to some extent, others have also considered it as vengeance for the Chinese who fought these American soldiers during the Boxer Rebellion. However, as the Balangiga Conflict showed, violence led to more violence. Perhaps the loss of more life might have been averted by other means, even during wartime. Such consideration can be noticed among Filipino commanders who surrendered to prevent more losses, such as Malvar and Guevarra.
Significance of the Balangiga Conflict
Of course, no one article can contain all of the details, but it is hoped that the vital ones have been presented. The story of the Balangiga Bells represented dynamics in international relations. While the Balangiga Conflict cannot be erased from our shared history, the relationship of the Philippines and the United States have turned from belligerent to cordial over a century after the incident. It shows how cooperation is key in making the enemies of yesterday be friends of tomorrow. The Balangiga Bells now symbolize more than singular national pride. It has become a goodwill symbol for a supposedly win-win situation for both sides. Then again, this must not make any nation complacent. Just as quickly can good foreign relations be spoiled by future incidents. Such are the shifting sands of the international arena. As a conclusion, one might be led to think: can war ever be justified? Can blood shed be cleansed by even more blood? In the first place, had it not been for the Balangiga Conflict, the bells might have been exiled anyway. In retrospect, what could have been done when put in such an uncompromising position in the future similar to that of the Filipinos of the past?
"Let me be very clear on this: There are some who are front loaders and pedantic in the government. The bells are returned and it was really because of the fervent prayers of the entire Filipino nation. But nobody can claim a singular credit for the generous act of the Americans. The bells are returned. The credit goes to the American people and to the Filipino people."
On December 11, 2018, the Balangiga Bells have been returned by the United States to the Philippines. In all, three bells were returned. The smaller bell, which has a mouth diamater of around 20 inches, was formerly located in Camp Red Cloud, an American military base in Uijeongbu, Republic of Korea (South Korea). The two larger bells, having mouth diameters of around 27 inches and 31 inches respectively, were formerly located at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The bells have long been regarded by some as a symbol of captive nationalism, wherein the colonial masters have triumphed over its colonies in both material and spirit. For those who may not be too spiritual, the bells are being considered as war booty. The Americans merely wanted to have tangible evidence of their specific victory, and the specific incident they won is what is now called the Balangiga Massacre or the Balangiga Conflict. What led to the exile of the bells? Also, why has a small-scale conflict in a Samar town of seemingly little significance to the overall course of the war escalated to more than a century old crack in Philippine-American relations? A lot has been written about the incident, and this may just be another Balangiga article.
The Filipino tactical ambush
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| General Vicente Lukban in masonic uniform Photo courtesy of lukban.org |
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| The American press cannot conceal the rare Filipino win Photo courtesy of the Salt Lake Herald |
Confusion and retaliation
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| Valeriano Abanador years after the Balangiga Conflict Photo courtesy of Rolando Borrinaga |
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| General Jacob Hurd Smith in Leyte Photo courtesy of Arnaldo Dumindin |
I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States... The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.
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| American soldiers check on Filipino dead Photo courtesy of Getty Images |
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| Littleton Waller (center) with his staff in Mexico Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
Among Smith's officers, it seemed that Major Waller's case was the one which gained widespread coverage. His infamous "March across Samar" caused the deaths of at least 39 Filipinos, 11 of which were porters shot in January 1902 for refusal to help their expedition, and allegedly attempted treachery against the Americans. Even while Smith's campaign in Samar continued, Waller was already facing court martial in Manila. Beginning in March 1902, the 13-officer military court was chaired by General William Bisbee. Waller appealed that while he did commit such acts, he cannot be held liable for them provided that the United States Army had already relocated him and his unit in Cavite. Thus, the Army did not have the jurisdiction to actually prosecute him. There was also a speculation that Waller was being harassed by his fellow officers for reporting success in the Samar campaign. In November 1901, military engagement against Lukban's forces in Basey resulted in an American victory. Eventually, upon agreement by President Roosevelt, Waller was acquitted. While Waller continued in service, distinguishing himself in the border war against Mexico, some believed that his court martial cost him a possible promotion as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the highest rank in the Marines.
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| General Claro Guevarra shake hands with General Frederick Dent Grant (center), son of US President Ulysses Grant |
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| "Kill Every One Over Ten" Photo courtesy of the Theodore Roosevelt Center |
Justification of the conflict
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| A Samar town burned by American soldiers Photo courtesy of Arnaldo Dumindin |
What about the Filipino action? Unlike the American campaign, the Filipinos under Abanador specifically targeted American soldiers. There was no compelling evidence that the ambush involved American civilians, demonstrating that the Filipino sense of conducting war may have been softer than the Americans, and advanced of its time. This was exemplified by Apolinario Mabini's response to Luna's policy against civilians who allegedly aided the enemy. Then again, there must have been a triggering incident to spark the Balangiga Conflict. According to Borrinaga's study, the Filipinos resisted starvation, imprisonment, and public shaming experienced due to the American actions. These incidents are not confined to Samar. Nevertheless, it showed that the Filipinos would not take military action without reason. In a sense, it was the Filipino response which appeared more of a retaliation than Smith's campaign, and to some extent, others have also considered it as vengeance for the Chinese who fought these American soldiers during the Boxer Rebellion. However, as the Balangiga Conflict showed, violence led to more violence. Perhaps the loss of more life might have been averted by other means, even during wartime. Such consideration can be noticed among Filipino commanders who surrendered to prevent more losses, such as Malvar and Guevarra.
Significance of the Balangiga Conflict
Of course, no one article can contain all of the details, but it is hoped that the vital ones have been presented. The story of the Balangiga Bells represented dynamics in international relations. While the Balangiga Conflict cannot be erased from our shared history, the relationship of the Philippines and the United States have turned from belligerent to cordial over a century after the incident. It shows how cooperation is key in making the enemies of yesterday be friends of tomorrow. The Balangiga Bells now symbolize more than singular national pride. It has become a goodwill symbol for a supposedly win-win situation for both sides. Then again, this must not make any nation complacent. Just as quickly can good foreign relations be spoiled by future incidents. Such are the shifting sands of the international arena. As a conclusion, one might be led to think: can war ever be justified? Can blood shed be cleansed by even more blood? In the first place, had it not been for the Balangiga Conflict, the bells might have been exiled anyway. In retrospect, what could have been done when put in such an uncompromising position in the future similar to that of the Filipinos of the past?
"Let me be very clear on this: There are some who are front loaders and pedantic in the government. The bells are returned and it was really because of the fervent prayers of the entire Filipino nation. But nobody can claim a singular credit for the generous act of the Americans. The bells are returned. The credit goes to the American people and to the Filipino people."
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