Mindanao's Great Uniter or Covert Destabilizer? Sultan Kudarat's Rise Between World Powers
"Turn your eyes to the subjected nations and look at the misery to which such glorious nations had been reduced to. Allow yourselves to be subjects and tomorrow you will be at the oars."
(Sultan Kudarat to the Maranao datus, 1639)
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Sultan Kudarat's monument stands tall in the province named after him Photo courtesy of BiyaherongBarat |
A divided sultanate
As an intellectual who was well-versed in the Quran and could speak multiple languages, Kudarat's greatness precedes him in history textbooks. However, it may come as a surprise that not all went well for the famed Maguindanao ruler. Inheriting the throne from his father, the powerful Kapitan Laut Buisan (reigned 1596-1619), the 38-year old Kudarat had to face serious challenges to his newfound leadership early on, and he was not even a sultan yet, officially speaking. As a quick backgrounder, Buisan once terrorized the Spanish in Luzon and Visayas, commanding a fleet of as many as 145 ships in 1602, until an agreement was reached with the colonial government in 1609. Learning of how much trouble he gave the Spanish with his naval campaigns, the Dutch also went to talks with the Kapitan Laut, who used the years of peace to consolidate his domain. Under his leadership, the Maguindanao sultanate expanded from the Pulangi area, which river stretches 320 kilometers from Bukidnon to Cotabato, to Lake Lanao in the north and Sarangani Bay in the south, creating allies with neighbors like Ternate, Moluccas, Sulu, Zamboanga, Caraga, and Buayan (now Datu Piang), all while never claiming to be a sultan himself (as neither did his predecessors). Buisan kept the son of his half-brother Datu Dimasangkay (Dimasancay) as the rajah muda (crown prince or young ruler) of Maguindanao while he exercised real authority and power within the polity. In sum, Kudarat inherited a strong state at peace with both Spain and the Netherlands, two world powers which had been at war since 1568. The conflict reached the Philippines in 1600, when the Dutch began naval offensives against the Spanish colonial government centered in Manila.
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| Sultan Kudarat's statue in Cotabato Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
In 1619, shortly after his father's demise, Kudarat was already asking for assistance from the Dutch, who had been in discussions with Buisan since 1614. Buayan, a Muslim state in the Pulangi area which once gravitated towards the leadership of the Kapitan Laut, began to defy Kudarat and went to war against Maguindanao. However, the Dutch did not see any advantage in supporting one Muslim ruler over the other, especially if both of them were potential antagonists of Spain. Instead, they attempted to broker peace between the two nations in 1621. The diplomatic effort floundered, and by 1622, Kudarat turned to another foreign power for aid, the Spanish. If he were winning against Buayan, he would have not required such help, but reality struck him. Kudarat was failing to keep his father's empire from falling apart, and he needed to act even if meant asking assistance from foreigners.
Unlike the Dutch, the Spanish were a bit more generous. They gave him one artillery piece as a loan. In exchange, Kudarat opened up commercial relations with the colonial government, allowed Christian missions, and even offered the Spanish to built a fort within his territory. Apparently, this actually helped in his war against Buayan, where a new leader was installed in the person of Datu Maputi (Rajah Monkay). Yet his troubles had only begun. In 1625, Kudarat had to shift his focus to Sarangani. While a vassal of Maguindanao, the Sarangani datus took advantage of the Buayan conflict to successfully break away from Kudarat's grasp. Soon to add to his woes were the Maranao and the Iranun datus of the Lake Lanao area who began to lean away from Maguindanao rule, establishing their own confederation of states which became the Pat a Pangampong sa Ranao (Four Sultanates of Lanao).
The four sultanates were centered in Unayan (now Lumbaca-Unayan), Masiu, Bayabao (now Lumba-Bayabao), and Baloi. The datus who founded these states were Dimaampao Kalinan of Unayan, Batara Di Kilaten (Batara A Kilatun) of Masiu, Butuanen Kalinan (Botowanun Di Kalinan) of Bayabao, and Amerogong Topaan (Amirogong Thopaan) of Baloi, all four of which were believed to be contemporaries of Sharif Kabungsuwan (Shariff Kabunsuan), the founder of the Maguindanao sultanate. Intermarriages between their families weaved Lanao and Maguindanao closer together. The Maranao and the Iranun datus of Kudarat's time then claimed descent from Kabungsuwan's great grandson Datu Dimasangkay, who also happened to be Kudarat's uncle and Buisan's half-brother. Since Kudarat was not directly from Dimasangkay's line, and having endured the leadership of Buisan, they might have seen it unsatisfactory to continue working under what they perceive as an undeserving usurper to the throne. In fact, the Lanao silsila (or selsilah) trace the confederation's creation from Kudarat's enthronement in 1619, but Kudarat's immediate attention to his southern campaigns might imply that the Lanao threat was not yet as potent and could be dealt with later. Another possible rationale may involve Kudarat having to prove himself first in war, Buayan and Sarangani being his litmus tests to demonstrate to the Maranao and the Iranun datus that he had what it takes to preserve the Maguindanao his father built. He would have his opportunity towards unification soon enough.
Lion of the land goes to the sea
After years of cooperation with the Spanish, Kudarat seemed to have been losing more than what he bargained for. The former alliance with Sulu built by his father Buisan was crumbling, partly due to the ascension of a new Sulu ruler, Sultan Muwallil Wasit (Rajah Bongsu). While Kudarat was married to one of Bongsu's daughters, he could not tolerate the Maguindanao leader's concessions to the Spanish. Ever since Buisan's demise, Bongsu took upon the mantle of the Moro naval campaigns. This was the result of a misunderstanding between the colonial government and the Sulu sultanate in 1624. A Sulu envoy led by Datu Ache was sent to Manila, but on the way back, a Spanish squadron chasing Camucones (Moro pirates from Tawi-Tawi) mistook the Sulu envoy for the pirates. Upon learning of this treachery, whether or not it was an honest error, Rajah Bongsu personally led a fleet of 30 ships with 2,000 troops to attack Camarines in 1627. They brought home vital weaponry from the Spanish garrison there, including artillery and guns, while burning the shipyard. A year later, the Spanish responded with a quick counteroffensive against Sulu from their squadron of 35 ships anchored in Cebu. This was a devastating victory, causing Bongsu's retreat inland, but it failed to end the Sulu threat. Until 1632, it would be a back and forth naval war between Sulu and the colonial government.
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| Sultan Kudarat's statue in Makati Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
In 1628, he received a Dutch envoy with whom he proposed a partnership with the raids, promising up to half of the loot being split up with the Dutch provided they forge a deal to help in his naval campaign. To bolster Dutch confidence in his capabilities to deliver results, Kudarat claimed that he was ruler of all Mindanao, except for Dapitan in Zamboanga, and another settlement, likely Cagayan de Oro, both of which fell away from Maguindanao's hold and were settled by the Spanish after Buisan's death. With this claim, he added that he could field a force of 10,000. This negotiations with the Dutch revealed the state of affairs a decade since Kudarat took power. First, Maguindanao was no longer the naval power that Buisan used to command. There was no need to appeal for Dutch aid if Kudarat knew Maguindanao had sufficient capability to launch raids, but for at least his initial years on the throne, he let Sulu do more of the raiding. Second, and more important to highlight, was Kudarat's growing military which can fight on land. While he may have no considerable navy, even if the claim of having 10,000 troops were half as true, this would still be a significant force to reckon. Then again, this army might only be powerful enough to keep Maguindanao together. Note how the Lanao confederation began to behave more independent of Maguindanao under Kudarat than under Buisan. Also, despite his welcoming gesture to the Spanish, Kudarat was still cautious. He even offered the Dutch to build a fort within his territory as well, a proposal aimed at counterbalancing the Spanish fort.
The momentum began to shift towards Kudarat in 1629, when his allies in Caraga were convinced to openly fight the Spanish. Since at least 1605, the Spanish began settling the area, particularly centered at Tandag in Surigao. The covert operations the Maguindanao ruler was sponsoring helped in attracting other Muslim leaders, and among them were Sulu itself. Thus, in 1634, a joint raid by Maguindanao and Sulu targeted Dapitan. The vulnerability of the Spanish settlement in Zamboanga, which was still quite small compared to the neighboring Samal communities in the rest of the peninsula, prompted calls for building a permanent fort. A year later, a 1,300-strong force (300 of which are Spanish) was sent to La Caldera (now Zamboanga City) to construct what is now Fort Pilar, the first of its kind in Mindanao. The Samals, while allies of Sulu and Maguindanao, did not oppose the project, but Kudarat and Bongsu saw the strategic importance of the fort. With a fort at the tip of the peninsula, the Spanish would be able to control or even stifle all sea movements in the Moro Gulf, commercial or otherwise. It also demonstrated that Zamboanga has fallen away from their grasp just two decades after Buisan, just enough to embolden the Spanish anyway. Note how Dapitan, the major Spanish settlement in the peninsula, was only established by around 1620.
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| Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
Corcuera's quest for greatness
1635 also saw the arrival of a new Spanish governor general, Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera. Formerly serving as governor of Panama, Corcuera was bent on distinguishing himself as a military man, and he saw the opportunity in Mindanao. Since at least 1600, more than 20,000 captives were captured by Moro raids in Spanish-controlled territories, some 3,000 of which were from Buisan's recorded campaigns alone. If the Philippines were to meet the Dutch threat, Mindanao should be kept at peace and taken out of the equation. Corcuera was more specific: replace Kudarat and Bongsu with puppet rulers, and deal with the Camucones who were being protected by Bongsu's brother, Sultan Abdul Jalilul Akbar of Brunei.
Launching his offensive from Zamboanga in 1637, Corcuera and his 800 troops was quick to invade the new Maguindanao capital of Lamitan (near Illana Bay, the former capital Slangan being at the Pulangi area). Here they saw Kudarat assembling his navy of more than a hundred ships, perhaps a relief to the Spanish who destroyed the Maguindanao vessels. They preempted what appeared to be preparations for a naval campaign against them. Meanwhile, Kudarat and his force of 2,000 retreated to three forts in Ilihan hills. After receiving reinforcements, the Spanish were able to pursue Kudarat and wound him. It did not take long before he lost the entire battle. After razing Lamitan and the three Maguindanao forts, Corcuera went to recognize Datu Maputi as the paramount ruler of Mindanao, a power move once used by Corcuera's predecessor Pedro de Acuña with Maputi's own predecessor, Rajah Sirungan (Sirongan). Maputi accepted the Spanish terms. Meanwhile, after learning of Kudarat's defeat, Bongsu also sent an envoy of peace to Zamboanga. While Kudarat still lived, the alliance he built fell after one campaign. It took only four days for the Spanish to achieve this, from March 13 to March 17.
The Spanish campaigns, however, were far from over. In 1638, an even larger force of 1,600 were sent against Sulu. They did not accept Bongsu's offer of peace, knowing well that they had the upper hand. After three months of siege, the Spanish were victorious and they managed to build a fort in Jolo. Meanwhile, with Kudarat still on the loose in the Iranun settlements at Lake Lanao, the Spanish placed a bounty on his head: 2,000 pesos if brought dead, and 4,000 pesos if brought alive. Adjusted to inflation, this meant Kudarat's bounty today (2020) is equivalent to around 3 million to 6 million pesos.
In 1639, the Spanish governor of Caraga sent 550 troops to the Lake Lanao area to convince the datus to renounce their loyalty to Kudarat and accept Spanish sovereignty. They then constructed a fort at Bayug (Tagoloan). However, it did not take long before Kudarat was back on his feet, rousing the Maranao datus to revoke their allegiance to Spain and attack the wooden fort at Bayug with a force of around 6,000. While unsuccessful, it helped solidify the distrust of the Maranao communities against the Spanish, leading to a more successful defense later on. It will take two centuries before the Spanish could again establish foothold in the Lake Lanao area. Still, Kudarat was far from redeeming his old domain. As for Corcuera, he returned to Manila triumphantly, and stories of his exploits became an inspiration of a form of Spanish entertainment now known as moro-moro, immortalizing for posterity the Muslim defeat. However, Corcuera's victory in the south did not translate for the same in the north. He lost his "hero status" when he withdrew troops from Taiwan in 1637 to focus on the campaign against Kudarat. Not only was Corcuera imprisoned, he was charged a penalty of 827,007 pesos, the presumed cost of Taiwan's loss from the Spanish colonial government.
Kudarat's veritable jihad
After repulsing the Spanish under his leadership, Kudarat sued for peace in 1639 and established a new capital in Simuay. During peacetime, he went on to strengthen his position in the Pulangi area by building forts such as that in Kabuntalan and Tawiran. However, this blocked Buayan's access to the sea, causing Maputi to appeal for Spanish assistance. When the Spanish force arrived at Simuay in 1643, Kudarat was nowhere to be found. Instead, the Maguindanao ruler proposed a more permanent treaty, not just temporary peace. Perhaps reminded of his defeat, Kudarat was no longer keen into engaging in large-scale battles against the Spanish. The treaty was ratified in 1645. This recognized Maguindanao territory extending from the Sibugay River in the north to Davao Gulf in the south, as well as the Pulangi area. However, Spanish settlements in Lanao such as Taraka, Bansayan and Didagun would remain under them. This also created a military alliance between Maguindanao and Spain. Then again, the treaty seemed to be exclusively for Kudarat. Maputi was out of the equation. This raises the contention that the recognized territories under Kudarat in the treaty may be more of a claim than reality, as the Spanish had once played the Buayan leader as the paramount ruler.
Upon establishing peace with the Spanish, Kudarat saw it fit to finally crown himself as sultan in 1645, the first among Maguindanao's rulers to ever assume the title. While formerly attributed by Spanish reports to his grandfather, Datu Bangkaya (Bancaya), as asulutan (as-sultan, an informal declension of sultan), there seemed to be no leaning towards actually using the title. Not even Kapitan Laut Buisan. Then again, if that title meant anything grand among his subordinates, it did not seem to have such a chilling effect. At around the same time, the Maranao and the Iranun datus began to enthrone their own sultans, each one for the four sultanates of the Lanao confederation. Was Kudarat's formal bid for sultan a response to the recalcitrance of the people inhabiting the Lake Lanao area? Despite the treaty with the Spanish, was Kudarat's power and influence beyond Maguindanao waning than expanding?
The peace with Kudarat was just what the Spanish needed. The war with the Dutch would go on until 1648, which in the Philippines culminated with the final Spanish victory at La Naval de Manila in 1646. Before the treaty, the Spanish were still wary that Kudarat might enter into an alliance with the Dutch, but it appeared that the Maguindanao ruler was interested in no more than commercial relations with them, albeit also with caution. Kudarat was particularly protective of their wax supply, a product which the Dutch was in demand of. More abundant in their trade were rice and tobacco, among others.
It only took ten years before Kudarat regain his standing once more, sufficient enough to largely ignore the 1645 treaty. He only required a trigger, a just cause, to launch his war. He saw the chance in 1655, when the Spanish refused to return the cannons and the captives they captured from the past conflict. He then cited the forceful methods Christian missionaries were using to convert his people. When no clear concessions were made, Kudarat figured he must strike first and declared a veritable jihad in 1656, but not all were enthusiastic about this renewed struggle. His allies in Sulu and Makassar did not respond, while the Spanish intercepted the message for Ternate. In fact, when Bongsu learned of this jihad, he was quick to clean his name by releasing Spanish captives in Sulu. Still, war was on. Samal allies in Zamboanga attacked Spanish settlements along the coast. Maputi's successor at Buayan, Rajah Balatamay (Baratamay), joined Kudarat's war and raided Mindoro and Marinduque in 1657.
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| Fort Pilar, also known as Real Fuerza de Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
The Spanish response was headed by the Governor of Zamboanga, Francisco de Esteybar, and his successor, Fernando Bobadilla. Managing to capture the Maguindanao capital of Simuay in 1658, the Spanish continued to chase the retreating Kudarat, but he avoided any engagement with them. This retreat and return tactic was typical of Filipino military battles. It displayed more brilliance than cowardice. However, the way Kudarat used the tactic did not exactly gain him any strategic advantage. By 1659, his veritable jihad seemed to have collapsed. Unlike the last war with Corcuera, the drive towards unification against a common enemy among the Mindanao rulers was not as powerful any longer. Perhaps seeing no sense in continuing the struggle, Kudarat would be witnessed in friendly terms with foreigners once more, taking advantage of peace with them to expand his territory and his economy. In 1660, he had made Butuan, a polity more than 400 kilometers from Simuay, his vassal.
Meanwhile, in less than two decades since the victory at La Naval de Manila, the colonial government faced another external threat. This time, it was from the Chinese pirate Zheng Chenggong (or Koxinga, Coxinga, Kuesing, Tehing-Tehingcorg), who managed to establish his kingdom in Taiwan in 1661 and was intent on exacting tribute from the Philippines. The threat was so great, the colonial government had to withdraw from their Zamboanga fort completely. It would take a few years before the Spanish would return to build the fort once more. As for Kudarat, the aging Maguindanao sultan would rule until 1671, maintaining the sultanate he forged in the past 52 years.
Most powerful sultan of the Philippines?
As far as history goes, Sultan Kudarat's lengthy reign was no small feat. In the 150 or so years since Maguindanao was established as a Muslim state, Kudarat ruled for a third of that time. However, the semblance of a powerful sultan was not as evident upon more critical analysis. It appeared that his power over Maguindanao was more dependent on his subordinate datus than his own. For most of his early years, even before his jihad, he was already having issues with neighboring polities under his sphere of influence, notably Lanao, Buayan, and Sarangani, among others. He was far from being the true paramount ruler of Mindanao despite his best intentions. Indeed, while Kudarat claimed to have 10,000 troops at one time during his career, he never fielded more than 2,000 in any single battle. Also, unlike his father Buisan, Kudarat had no great naval campaign recorded beyond Mindanao. Either he was caught assembling his own navy before it was even launched, as in 1637, or he would only successfully do it with the help of another power, as with the combined raid with Sulu in 1634. Many of his military campaigns were confined into at least keeping the sultanate together.
If this was the case, what made Sultan Kudarat great? One could be the extensive coverage of his reign. It may be mostly defeats and losses, but he was documented nonetheless. This created a perception that Kudarat's potency was the perfect storm to overthrow the Spanish in Mindanao, albeit in reality, a tamer, more economically-focused Kudarat could be seen, especially in his later years as sultan. But perhaps that was also one reason why the Spanish and the Dutch noted him so much. You would not usually expect foreign observers to record their own losses in detail. Recall Buisan's naval campaigns, while mostly successful, seemed no more than footnotes in history.
Then again, Kudarat surviving the many attempts of the Spanish to take him out was remarkable on its own. Corcuera's famed military campaign was probably his closest brush to death, but he still managed to recover somehow and retain his rule over Maguindanao, a state that once saw a power struggle in leadership. As the saying goes, beware of an old man in a profession where men usually die young. We were probably taught by Kudarat that winning is not everything that made someone great. What was important was not giving up. There would never be another Sultan Kudarat, or at least that was what the Spaniards wanted to believe because even if more imagined than real, his potential as a threat sapped vital colonial resources. As to his legacy as a great uniter, "the lord of all Mindanao", whether or not he could be regarded as a national hero or a covert destabilizer, it might as well be placed in the hearts of the Filipino people.
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| Moro war dance Photo courtesy of Wikipedia |
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